Contents	5
	List of Figures	13
	List of Tables	15
	Preface	17
	Acknowledgments	19
	Chapter 1 INTRODUCTION	21
	1.1 Trust and Computing	22
	1.2 Instantiations	22
	1.3 Design and Applications	25
	1.4 Progression	27
	Chapter 2 MOTIVATING SCENARIOS	29
	2.1 Properties	29
	2.2 Basic Usage	30
	2.3 Examples of Basic Usage	32
	2.4 Position and Interests	34
	2.5 Examples of Positioning	35
	2.6 The Idealogical Debate	38
	2.7 Further Reading	38
	Chapter 3 ATTACKS	39
	3.1 Physical Attack	41
	3.1.1 No Armor	42
	3.1.2 Single Chip Devices	43
	3.1.3 Multi-chip Devices	43
	3.2 Software Attacks	44
	3.2.1 Buffer Overflow	45
	3.2.2 Unexpected Input	45
	3.2.3 Interpretation Mismatches	46
	3.2.4 Time-of-check vs Time-of-use	47
	3.2.5 Atomicity	48
	3.2.6 Design Flaws	49
	3.3 Side- channel Analysis	50
	3.3.1 Timing Attacks	50
	3.3.2 Power Attacks	53
	3.3.3 Other Avenues	54
	3.4 Undocumented Functionality	55
	3.4.1 Example: Microcontroller Memory	56
	3.4.2 Example: FLASH Memory	57
	3.4.3 Example: CPU Privileges	58
	3.5 Erasing Data	58
	3.6 System Context	59
	3.7 Defensive Strategy	61
	3.7.1 Tamper Evidence	61
	3.7.2 Tamper Resistance	61
	3.7.3 Tamper Detection	61
	3.7.4 Tamper Response	62
	3.7.5 Operating Envelope	62
	3.8 Further Reading	62
	Chapter 4 FOUNDATIONS	63
	4.1 Applications and Integration	63
	4.1.1 Kent	64
	4.1.2 Abyss	64
	4.1.3 Citadel	65
	4.1.4 Dyad	66
	4.2 Architectures	68
	4.2.1 Physical Security	68
	4.2.2 Hardware and Software	69
	4.3 Booting	70
	4.4 The Defense Community	72
	4.5 Further Reading	72
	Chapter 5 DESIGN CHALLENGES	75
	5.1 Context	75
	5.1.1 Personal	75
	5.1.2 Commercial	76
	5.2 Obstacles	77
	5.2.1 Hardware	77
	5.2.2 Software	79
	5.3 Requirements	83
	5.3.1 Commercial Requirements	83
	5.3.2 Security Requirements	84
	5.3.3 Authenticated Execution	86
	5.4 Technology Decisions	87
	5.5 Further Reading	91
	Chapter 6 PLATFORM ARCHITECTURE	93
	6.1 Overview	93
	6.1.1 Security Architecture	94
	6.2 Erasing Secrets	95
	6.2.1 Penetration Resistance and Detection	96
	6.2.2 Tamper Response	96
	6.2.3 Other Physical Attacks	97
	6.3 The Source of Secrets	98
	6.3.1 Factory Initialization	98
	6.3.2 Field Operations	99
	6.3.3 Trusting the Manufacturer	101
	6.4 Software Threats	101
	6.4.1 Software Threat Model	102
	6.4.2 Hardware Access Locks	102
	6.4.3 Privacy and Integrity of Secrets	105
	6.5 Code Integrity	105
	6.5.1 Loading and Cryptography	106
	6.5.2 Protection against Malice	106
	6.5.3 Protection against Reburn Failure	107
	6.5.4 Protection against Storage Errors	108
	6.5.5 Secure Bootstrapping	109
	6.6 Code Loading	110
	6.6.1 Authorities	111
	6.6.2 Authenticating the Authorities	112
	6.6.3 Ownership	112
	6.6.4 Ordinary Loading	113
	6.6.5 Emergency Loading	116
	6.7 Putting it All Together	117
	6.8 What’s Next	119
	6.9 Further Reading	119
	Chapter 7 OUTBOUND AUTHENTICATION	121
	7.1 Problem	121
	7.1.1 The Basic Problem	122
	7.1.2 Authentication Approach	122
	7.1.3 User and Developer Scenarios	123
	7.1.4 On-Platform Entities	124
	7.1.5 Secret Retention	124
	7.1.6 Authentication Scenarios	125
	7.1.7 Internal Certification	127
	7.2 Theory	128
	7.2.1 What the Entity Says	129
	7.2.2 What the Relying Party Concludes	129
	7.2.3 Dependency	130
	7.2.4 Soundness	131
	7.2.5 Completeness	132
	7.2.6 Achieving Both Soundness and Completeness	132
	7.2.7 Design Implications	133
	7.3 Design and Implementation	134
	7.3.1 Layer Separation	135
	7.3.2 The Code-Loading Code	135
	7.3.3 The OA Manager	136
	7.3.4 Naming	139
	7.3.5 Summary	139
	7.3.6 Implementation	140
	7.4 Further Reading	141
	Chapter 8 VALIDATION	143
	8.1 The Validation Process	144
	8.1.1 Evolution	144
	8.1.2 FIPS 140-1	145
	8.1.3 The Process	146
	8.2 Validation Strategy	146
	8.3 Formalizing Security Properties	149
	8.3.1 Building Blocks	150
	8.3.2 Easy Invariants	151
	8.3.3 Controlling Code	151
	8.3.4 Keeping Secrets	152
	8.4 Formal Verification	154
	8.5 Other Validation Tasks	156
	8.6 Reflection	158
	8.7 Further Reading	159
	Chapter 9 APPLICATION CASE STUDIES	161
	9.1 Basic Building Blocks	161
	9.2 Hardened Web Servers	162
	9.2.1 The Problem	162
	9.2.2 Using a TCP	164
	9.2.3 Implementation Experience	169
	9.3 Rights Management for Big Brother’s Computer	172
	9.3.1 The Problem	172
	9.3.2 Using a TCP	173
	9.3.3 Implementation Experience	174
	9.4 Private Information	175
	9.4.1 The Problem	175
	9.4.2 Using a TCP: Initial View	177
	9.4.3 Implementation Experience	178
	9.4.4 Using Oblivious Circuits	180
	9.4.5 Reducing TCP Memory Requirements	183
	9.4.6 Adding the Ability to Update	185
	9.5 Other Projects	187
	9.5.1 Postal Meters	187
	9.5.2 Kerberos KDC	187
	9.5.3 Mobile Agents	187
	9.5.4 Auctions	187
	9.5.5 Marianas	188
	9.5.6 Trusted S/MIME Gateways	189
	9.5.7 Grid Tools	189
	9.6 Lessons Learned	190
	9.7 Further Reading	191
	Chapter 10 TCPA/ TCG	193
	10.1 Basic Structure	195
	10.2 Outbound Authentication	198
	10.3 Physical Attacks	199
	10.4 Applications	200
	10.5 Experimentation	200
	10.6 TPM 1.2 Changes	201
	10.7 Further Reading	201
	Chapter 11 EXPERIMENTING WITH TCPA/TCG	203
	11.1 Desired Properties	204
	11.2 The Lifetime Mismatch	204
	11.3 Architecture	205
	11.4 Implementation Experience	209
	11.5 Application: Hardened Apache	210
	11.6 Application: OpenCA	211
	11.7 Application: Compartmented Attestation	213
	11.8 Further Reading	214
	Chapter 12 NEW HORIZONS	215
	12.1 Privilege Architectures	215
	12.2 Hardware Research	217
	12.2.1 XOM	217
	12.2.2 MIT AEGIS	218
	12.2.3 Cerium	219
	12.2.4 Virtual Secure Coprocessing	219
	12.2.5 Virtual Machine Monitors	219
	12.2.6 Others	220
	12.3 Software Research	221
	12.3.1 Software-based Attestation	222
	12.3.2 Hiding in Plain Sight	222
	12.4 Current Industrial Platforms	223
	12.4.1 Crypto Coprocessors and Tokens	223
	12.4.2 Execution Protection	223
	12.4.3 Capability-based Machines	224
	12.5 Looming Industry Platforms	224
	12.5.1 LaGrande	224
	12.5.2 TrustZone	226
	12.5.3 NGSCB	226
	12.6 Secure Coprocessing Revisited	228
	12.7 Further Reading	229
	Glossary	231
	References	241
	About the Author	255
	Index	257